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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD S. BENNETT, WALLACE 
F. BENNETT, and HAROLD H. 
BENNETT, Trustees, dba THE 
BENNETT ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
ARNEL K. DOWNARD, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
vs. 
CLARIS E. JOHNSON and VELMA 
JOHNSON and BOYD J. CLARK 
and IRIS J. CLARK, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Arnel K. Downard is a defendant and respondent, 
together with the defendants and appellants Johnson and 
defendants and appellants Clark in an action brought 
by the Bennett Association, hereinafter referred to as 
"Bennett's", alleging that Downard had entered into a 
contract with Bennett's for goods and services which 
Bennett's provided. These goods and services included 
the sale and installation of glass at a Taco Siesta build-
ing located in Weber County, Utah. Bennett's cause 
of action against Downard is based upon the fact 
Case No. 
13740 
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that Downard never made payment to Bennett's and 
the cause of action against the defendants Johnson 
and defendants Clark is based upon the fact that 
as owners of the building, the defendants Clark and de-
fendants Johnson, failed to exhibit a sufficient bond con-
trary to 14-2-1 and 14-2-2, U.C.A., 1953, as amended. The 
defendant Downard cross-claimed against the co-defend-
ants Johnson and Clark for the sum of any judgment 
which might be rendered against him in favor of Ben-
nett's alleging that the defendants Johnson and defend-
ants Clark owed to Downard money due under a contract 
they entered into for the construction of the building 
in question. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Stated simply, Bennett's was granted judgment 
against all the defendants in the District Court of Weber 
County. The trial court granted Bennett's judgment 
against Downard as a matter of law and thereafter based 
upon special interrogatories the jury returned a verdict 
indicating that Bennett's should have judgment against 
defendants Johnson and Clark and further that defendant 
Downard have judgment over against defendants John-
son and Clark for the amount Downard would have to 
pay to Bennett's and an additional amount which was 
owed to Downard by the defendants Johnson and Clark. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The record on appeal consists of two volumes, one 
of which consists of pleadings, minute entries and similar 
papers. This respondent will refer to this volume by the 
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designation " R " , and the other volume which is a trail-
script of the testimony and proceedings held on May 1, 
1974 will be designated by the letters " T r . " 
The defendant and respondent Downard was a li-
censed general contractor doing business in the State of 
Utah (Tr. 65). He sometimes conducted his business 
under the name and style of Arnel K. Downard Construc-
tion Company but at no time was incorporated (Tr. 69). 
During the year of 1968 he was contacted by Taco Siesta, 
International, a California corporation, concerning the 
construction of several fast food restaurants (Tr. 70, 
71). I t was agreed upon with Taco Siesta that he would 
construct restaurants at certain sites. One of these sites 
was to be 3715 South Washington Boulevard, in South 
Ogden, Utah. This site was owned by the defendants 
Johnson and the defendants Clark (Tr. 38, 65). 
Mr. Downard entered into an agreement with Taco 
Siesta and the defendants Johnson and Clark which is 
evidenced by defendants' Exhibit 1. This contract is dated 
August 25, 1968 and provided that Mr. Downard would 
construct the Taco Siesta facility and that the owners 
would pay to Mr. Downard the sum of $31,860.00. 
Prior to this the defendant Claris Johnson, on behalf 
of himself and the defendants Velma Johnson, Boyd J . 
Clark, and Iris J . Clark, entered into a contract with 
Taco Siesta, the California corporation mentioned above, 
whereby Taco Siesta would have its franchisee occupy 
the building and pay rent to the Johnsons and Clarks (Tr. 
53). Immediately after the contract of August 25, 1968 
was entered into Mr. Downard undertook the construc-
3 
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tion of the building located on the defendants Clarks' 
and Johnsons'property. 
Shortly thereafter Mr. Johnson advised Mr. Down-
ard that he and the other defendants would need a bond 
(Tr. 47). Pursuant to this request from Mr. Johnson, 
Mr. Downard procured the bond (Tr. 57). This bond was 
admitted into evidence as plaintiffs' Exhibit B. 
Thereafter as construction of the building prog-
ressed, Mr. Downard approached Mr. Johnson on several 
occasions with a list of the subcontractors and material-
men to whom money was owed as a result of the con-
struction of the building (Tr. 66). On these occasions Mr. 
Johnson, on behalf of himself and the other defendants, 
would draw upon a construction account at First Se-
curity Bank in Salt Lake City, Utah, which was opened 
for the express purpose of paying for the construction of 
the building (Tr. 45). Mr. Johnson would draw upon this 
account and pay Mr. Downard directly (Tr. 44, 45). On 
some occasions the checks or drafts were made payable 
not only to Mr. Downard but subcontractors and mate-
rialmen as well (Tr. 44, 66). At about the time the build-
ing was completed, Mr. Downard approached Mr. John-
son and asked for additional funds to pay Bennett's and 
other subcontractors, but Mr. Johnson advised him that 
there were no additional funds (Tr. 20, 79, 80). Mr. John-
son explained that since rent was owed to defendants 
Johnson and Clark by Taco Siesta, Johnson, on behalf 
of himself and the other defendants, he deducted these 
4 
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payments from the construction account. At this point 
in time not all the materialmen and subcontractors had 
been paid, nor had Mr. Downard been paid for his ser-
vices. The total amount which had been paid to that point 
totaled the sum of $29,189.81. One of the subcontractors 
who had not been paid was Bennett's to whom was owed 
the sum of $2,029.00. 
After Downard made demand upon the defendant 
Johnson and the other defendants Johnson gave to Mr. 
Downard his personal check in the approximate sum of 
$379.00 (Tr. 15, 24). This check is dated May 17, 1969 
and drawn upon Mr. Johnson's personal account. It is 
defendant's Exhibit 3. 
This left a balance owing to Bennett's in the sum of 
$1,652.00 and that although demand by Bennett's was 
made upon Mr. Downard and the other defendants, no 
payment was made. Downard explained to Bennett's that 
he had no funds with which to pay them as an excuse 
for not making payment. He further explained that the 
reason he had no funds was that Mr. Johnson refused to 
make further payment under the construction contract. 
Thereafter Bennett's instituted the lawsuit against 
all of the defendants, including Downard. While the law-
suit was in progress, the defendants Johnson and Clark 
sold the building for $56,500.00 (Tr. 60, 61). The interim 
between the time the building was completed nntil the 
time it was sold it was also rented and the tenants paid 
approximately $1,150.00 in rent (Tr. 62, 63). 
5 
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Bennett's made demand upon the defendants John-
son and Clark to produce the bond, but the bond was 
never provided for inspection (Tr. 83, 84). It was the 
contention of Bennett's that they should have judgment 
against Downard based upon his failure to pay for the 
goods and services provided and further that Bennett's 
should have judgment against defendants Johnson and 
Clark on the basis that they never exhibited the bond as 
provided for in 14-2-1 and 14-2-2, U.C.A., 1953 as amend-
ed. It was the position of Downard on his cross-claim 
that although the defendants Johnson and Clark claimed 
they were not parties to the contract (Defendants' Ex-
hibit 1), that in the alternative defendants Johnson and 
Clark would be estopped in denying that they were not 
parties to the contract since they had made the contract 
their own by their actions or that there was an implied 
contract between Downard and the defendants Johnson 
and Clark whereby it was agreed that they would pay 
the sum of $31,860.00 to Mr. Downard for his services 
and also to pay for the construction of the building. 
Upon these facts Judge Wahlquist ruled as a matter 
of law that the plaintiff Bennett's was entitled to a judg-
ment against the defendant Downard. On these same 
facts the jury returned and answered the interrogatories 
indicating that Johnson and the other defendants were 
parties to the construction contract marked Defendants' 
Exhibit 1. The jury also returned and answered interrog-
atories indicating that the plaintiff Bennett should have 
judgment against the defendants Johnson and Clark 
based upon their failure to exhibit the bond as required by 
law. Defendant Downard will only address himself to 
6 
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points 2, 3, 4 and 5 as set out in appellants' brief since 
point 1 is an issue involving the plaintiff and defendants 
Johnson and Clark only. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING 
TO GRANT DEFENDANTS JOHNSONS' 
AND CLARKS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
DOWNARD'S CROSS-CLAIM. 
It is the position of defendant Downard that al-
though there was no express contract between the de-
fendants Johnson and Clark and Downard for the con-
struction of the building, there was an implied contract 
which existed between these parties by virtue of John-
sons' relations with Downard. Downard also contends 
that Johnson, on behalf of himself and the other defend-
ants, adopted the construction contract as his own, as 
well. 
One of the cases cited by the appellant is McCaffery 
v. Cronin, 140 C.A.2d 528, 295 P.2d 587 (1956). The John-
sons and Clarks contend that an implied contract is one 
not expressed by the parties thereto but gathered from 
facts showing their mutual intent to contract. Respondent 
Downard would agree with this, but believes a closer 
reading of the case supports his position rather than 
the position of the Johnsons and the Clarks. 
The McCaffery case is a case wherein McCaffery 
sought to have the court declare exactly what his rights 
and interests in certain insurance commissions were. The 
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trial court ruled that there was no agreement and that, 
therefore, Cronin was not obligated to pay McCaffery 
any portion of the commissions paid to Cronin. The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals in the Third District reversed 
this decision, however, and stated, after referring to the 
efforts made and work performed by McCaffery that: 
It is said that an implied contract is one not ex-
pressed by the parties but gathered from the facts 
showing a mutual intent to contract. Travelers 
Fire Insurance Company v. Brock and Companif, 
47 Cal. App. 2d 387, 118 P.2d 25. Where a party 
has conferred upon another with the assent of 
the latter a benefit which was not intended as a 
gratuity the law implies a promise on the part of 
the party receiving the benefits to pay the rea-
sonable value. The principle was thus stated in 
DeRosier v. Vierr, 109 Cal. App.2d 291, 294, 240 
P.2d 660, 662; "When services are rendered by 
one person from which another derives a benefit, 
although there is no express contract or agree-
ment to pay for the services, there is a presump-
tion of law which arises from the proof of services 
rendered that the person enjoying the benefit of 
the same is bound to pay what they are reason-
ably worth." The doctrine of implied contracts 
has its foundation in the doctrine of unjust enrich-
ment. Anderson v. Doolittle, 97 Cal. App.2d 836, 
218 P.2d 848. 295 P.2d at 591. 
The Court of Appeals then reversed the trial court and 
ruled that there was an implied contract existing between 
the plaintiff and the defendant and that the plaintiff was 
entitled to a judgment on that basis. 
The Johnsons and Clarks further cite Corpus Juris 
Secondum, Vol. 17, Contracts, §4. The reading of this 
citation indicates that certainly the intent to contract 
8 
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is necessary, but there are other elements involved here. 
I t is stated in Corpus Juris Secondum that : 
A contract implied in fact is one not expressed by 
the parties but implied from facts and circum-
stances showing a mutual intention to contract. I t 
does not arise contrary to law or the express 
declaration of the parties. Contracts implied in 
law or quasi or constructive contracts are dis-
tinguishable in that such contracts do not rest on 
assent of the parties but may exist regardless of 
assent, 17 C.J.S., Contracts, §4, p. 557. 
I t is further stated: 
If a person who is a stranger to a contract de-
liberately enters into relations with one of the 
parties which are consistent only with an adop-
tion of such contract and so acts as to lead such 
party to believe that he has made the contract his 
own, he will not be permitted afterward to re-
pudiate it. 17 C.J.S., Contracts, §4, p. 562. 
The Supreme Court of this state has adopted a 
similar approach in regard to implied contracts. In the 
case of Wooldridge v. Wareing, 120 Utah 514, 236 P.2d 
341 (1951), the Utah Supreme Court recognized the 
existence of implied contracts. 
In that case the plaintiff filed his action against the 
defendant on two counts, the first being breach of con-
tract and the second one of quantum meruit for services 
rendered to the defendant. The plaintiff and defendant 
worked together as sales representatives, and they con-
tacted numerous prospects together in an effort to sell 
insurance plans. The evidence was that the plaintiff 
9 
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assisted the defendant in making the sales and that they 
jointly worked together traveling extensively in an effort 
to make sales. 
The trial court found that there was no express con-
tract between the parties, although the plaintiff had re-
quested a written statement from the defendant as to 
the commissions he would earn. He received a response 
from the defendant that he would be fair and square with 
the plaintiff. The Utah Supreme Court in upholding the 
decision of the trial court stated: 
Here, be it remembered, the court found there was 
no express contract, to which finding both parties 
subscribed. Hence, plaintiff's recovery must be 
had not by way of express agreement of the 
parties but by way of a contract implied in fact, 
v based on the principle that the law will impose an 
obligation to pay reasonable compensation where 
one has accepted the unof ficious services of another 
not gratituitously but under circumstances that 
would make it unfair not to pay. It is one thing to 
deny recovery on a contract where the terms 
thereof are so indefinite as to lack a manifestation 
of mutual assent. Also, it is one thing to restrict 
recovery on a contract to an amount which by its 
terms is to be determined by him who is to pay, 
good faith being assured. But it would be an en-
tirely different thing to deny recovery where lack-
ing an expressed agreement, one party renders 
valuable service to another in an unof ficious man-
ner, the latter accepting the fruits thereof. In such 
event, the law, being reasonable, involves reason 
in solving the problem,, and requires that he who 
accepts service from him who unofficiously per-
forms under circumstances justifying the latter 
in reasonably assuming he would be compensated 
must pay the reasonable value thereof. 120 Utah 
at 517, 236 P.2d at 342. 
10 
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The appellant cites Baugh v. Barley, 112 Utah 1, 
184 P.2d 335 (1947). This case is not applicable here 
since the contract in question involved an oral promise 
whereby the defendant agreed to sell to the plaintiff a 
certain parcel of land. The plaintiff paid the sum of 
$500.00 by way of check. The defendant endorsed the 
check and negotiated it, but thereafter plaintiff entered 
into a contract to sell the same tract of land to another 
party at a profit. The defendant hearing of this sold the 
land directly to the third party. The original down pay-
ment which was $500.00 was returned by the defendant 
to the plaintiff, but the plaintiff brought an action against 
the defendant for the sum of $525.00 which was the 
amount the defendant profited from the sale. This would 
also be the amount that the plaintiff would have profited 
had he sold the property himself to the third party who 
was the ultimate buyer. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that there was no un-
just enrichment because the work done by the plaintiff 
in securing the new buyer was work done for his own 
benefit. The court stated that the benefit conferred upon 
the defendant was an incident of plaintiff's efforts to en-
rich himself. The court stated: 
Generally unless such services enhance or benefit 
the property of the defendant or otherwise confer 
on him a direct benefit, they do not form the basis 
for a contract imposed by law because there is no 
unjust enrichment as that term is used in law. 
Where such services operate to confer a direct 
benefit upon the defendant, they may be recover-
able. 112 Utah at 7. 
11 
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In another case, McCollum v. Clothier, 121 Utah 311, 
241 P.2d 468 (1952), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that 
in an action to recover under an implied contract for ser-
vices rendered the plaintiff was entitled to recover under 
the circumstances. The plaintiff brought his action on 
the basis of quantum meruit for services rendered and 
travel expenses incurred in securing buyers and bidders 
for certain machinery which was sold for the defendant's 
benefit, McCollum obtained access to the premises where 
certain machinery was kept. The plaintiff, McCollum, 
showed the equipment to several prospects and made 
trips to Salt Lake City and Pocatello in response to de-
fendant's request in an effort to sell the equipment. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that there was an im-
plied contract and stated as follows: 
It is, therefore, essential that the court should 
exercise caution in imposing the obligations of 
implied contract, as contrasted to express contract, 
where the parties have actually defined and agreed 
to the terms they are found by. With such cau-
tion in mind, the test for the court to apply was: 
Under all the evidence were the circumstances 
such that the plaintiff could reasonably assume 
he was to be paid and that the defendant should 
have reasonably expected to pay for such services. 
Here the fact that the plaintiff had been working 
previously for the trustee in a similar capacity, 
for which he had been paid, coupled with the re-
quest made by the defendant's attorney and agent 
to continue the work, and the knowledge of the 
defendant himself that the work was being done, 
are all factors which the trial judge could take 
into consideration in applying the above rule. We 
conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support 
12 
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these findings of the court that there was an im-
plied contract to pay for the reasonable value of 
the plaintiff's services. 121 Utah at 315, 
It is apparent that the courts have held that once 
one party unofficiously renders services and the other 
party accepts those services under circumstances justify-
ing the party rendering the services to believe that he 
would be compensated, then the person receiving the 
benefit of those services must pay the reasonable value 
thereof. It is apparent from the record that Mr. Down-
ard who rendered services could believe that he was going 
to be paid by the Johnsons and the Clarks for his services 
he had performed in the same manner in building two 
other restaurants in Salt Lake all the while believing he 
had a contract with the owner of the building and the 
property (Tr. 70, 75). The construction contract, de-
fendants ' Exhibit 1, refers to Johnson as the owner and 
the person with whom Downard was contracting. In addi-
tion, Downard would present certain bills, or at least a 
list of bills, for payment and Johnson would pay Down-
ard in order that Downard could pay the subcontractors 
and materialmen. Towards the end of the contract when 
the money in the construction account at First Security 
State Bank was depleted, Johnson paid out of his own 
account the sum of $379.00 (Defendants' Exhibit 3). In 
addition, it was Johnson and not Taco Siesta who in-
structed Downard to obtain a performance bond, which 
Downard did (Tr. 78). 
As to whether or not Downard could reasonably be-
lieve that he had a contract with the owner, not only was 
Downard operating under this belief, but Mr. Winters, 
13 
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the credit manager for Bennett's, held the same belief 
(Tr. 29). The Johnsons and the Clarks now argue that 
they had their contract with Taco Siesta and not Downard, 
but when Winters, the credit man for Bennett's, approach-
ed Johnson for the money owed or in the alternative, the 
presentation of the bond, Johnson never told Winters that 
he had no responsibility for payment of the materialmen 
or subcontractors or that Winters should seek payment 
from Taco Siesta. At no time prior to the institution of 
the lawsuit did Johnson indicate that he was not making 
the contract his own. At no time prior to the institution 
of the lawsuit did he claim that he was not a party to the 
contract. 
The question as to whether or not an implied con-
tract existed between Downard and defendants Johnson 
and Clark was ultimately a question of fact to be decided 
by the jury, and the court did not err in failing to grant 
the motion of Johnson and Clark to dismiss defendant 
Downard's cross-claim. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2. 
After setting forth the second interrogatory and 
stating that the contract (Defendant's Exhibit 1) did not 
give Taco Siesa authority to contract on behalf of John-
son and Clark the interrogatories state as follows: 
. . . However, you are instructed that Johnson 
will not be permitted to deny that he is a party 
to the contract, if he knew that such a contract had 
been executed and knew that an innocent person 
14 
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was relying thereon; and he did not inform such 
person, that he was not a party to the contract, 
and deliberately lay back and secretly let others 
complete the project believing he was a party to 
the contract. 
However, Johnson would not be estopped to deny 
that he is a party to the contract if Downard knew 
that Wilkins had no authority to act for Johnsons 
or the Clarks or knew that the only party that he 
was contracting with was Taco Siesta. 
The payment of debts to Taco Siesta by Johnson 
would not be sufficient unless it was done in a 
fashion that it reasonably misled Downard into be-
lieving that Johnson was the contracting party. 
These instructions follow substantially the statement of 
law given in 17 Corpus Juris Secondum, §4, Contracts. It 
is stated in 17 Corpus Juris Secondum, §4, p. 564: 
Thus, where one at the request of the owner per-
forms work and labor in constructing or repairing, 
without an express agreement for compensation, 
the law implies a promise on the part of the 
owner to make a reasonable compensation there-
for, and it has been held that where one stands by 
in silence and sees work done in the improve-
ment of his premises, of which he accepts the 
benefit, a promise to pay therefor may be implied. 
17 O.J.S., p. 564. 
The statement in Corpus Juris Secondum and the case 
law cited above are in agreement with the instruction 
given by the court. The Johnsons and the Clarks knew 
that an innocent person, Mr. Downard, was performing 
this contract, and yet they did nothing to advise him that 
they were not a party to the contract or that they had 
no contract with him. Downard unofficiously performed 
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services which conferred a benefit upon the defendants 
Johnson and Clark, and he could have reasonably be-
lieved under the circumstances that he had a contract 
with the Johnsons and Clarks. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUS-
TAIN THE VERDICT OF THE JURY. 
The appellants claim that the evidence adduced at 
the trial is insufficient to sustain the jury's answers, 
particularly the jury's answer to Interrogatory No. 2 
which relates to this defendant and respondent. In doing 
this, the Johnsons and the Clarks rely upon defendants' 
Exhibit 2 which is the contract between the Johnsons 
and the Clarks and Taco Siesta. In addition, they rely 
upon defendants' Exhibit 1 which is the contract known 
as the standard form agreement between owner and con-
tractor and the fact that neither the Johnsons nor the 
Clarks signed this contract. The only other fact they rely 
on is that Johnson claimed that the reason he made pay-
ments directly to Downard was to protect Downard. 
In making this argument the Johnsons and the 
Clarks fail to take into consideration all the other evi-
dence adduced at the trial which supports the jury's ver-
dict. This includes the fact that Johnson is the one who 
told Downard to obtain the bond and at Johnson's request 
Downard did obtain the bond. For this and other reasons 
Downard felt that he had a contract with the Johnsons 
and the Clarks. This was borne out by the bond in which 
it is stated that there was a contract between Downard 
and the Johnsons and the Clarks. Downard's belief was 
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supported by the fact that Johnson made all of the pay-
ments to Downard directly out of his construction account 
specifically set up to pay for the building. In addition, 
after the funds in the construction account were depleted 
as a result of the Johnsons and the Clarks making deduc-
tions for money owed to them by Taco Siesta, Johnson 
made a payment directly to Downard out of his personal 
account which is Defendants' Exhibit 3. 
In addition, Downard testified that he built two other 
buildings under the same set of circumstances in Salt 
Lake City (Tr. 70, 75). Apparently payments were made 
to him directly by the owner and he always felt that he 
had a contract with the owner (Tr. 70, 75). Johnson's 
conduct further indicated that he had a contract with 
Downard since when approached by Mr. Winter, the 
credit manager for Bennett's, Winter stated that John-
son never told him that if he wanted additional money, 
he should go to Taco Siesta (Tr. 24, 25). This led Winter 
also to believe that the contract was between Downard, 
the contractor, and Johnson, who was the owner. 
It has long been the rule that on appeal the review 
of the evidence is to be made in a light most favorable to 
the respondent, as stated in Price v. Price, 4 Utah 2d 
153, 289 P.2d 1044 (1955): 
Defendant recites facts testified to by him which 
he apparently assumes the court was required to 
consider as true, but it is obvious from the trial 
court's conclusion that the latter did not believe 
everything defendant said. Other evidence ad-
duced, if believed, would support the award, and 
under familiar principles we cannot disturb the 
judgment in such event. 4 Utah 2d at 154. 
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Another case holding that the evidence must be 
viewed in a light most favorable to the respondent is 
Staheli v. Grant, 2 Utah 2d 421, 276 P.2d 489 (1954). The 
Utah Supreme Court upheld the decision of the trial 
court in granting a verdict for the plaintiff. In consider-
ing whether or not the evidence adduced at trial was 
sufficient to sustain the verdict of the trial court, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
From such facts we cannot say the evidence was 
such as to require us to depart from our stated 
principles that on conflicting matters the evidence 
is to be viewed in a light most favorable to the 
party for whom the judgment was entered and 
when so viewed, if there is evidence supporting the 
judgment, it will not be disturbed. 2 Utah 2d at 
422. 
The Utah Supreme Court has set a criterion to be 
followed in reviewing the evidence adduced in considering 
whether the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict. 
In the case of Ray v. Consolidated Freightways, 4 Utah 
2d 137, 289 P.2d 196 (1955), the defendant appealed the 
verdict rendered in favor of the plaintiff. Among other 
errors the defendant claimed that the verdict which indi-
cated that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent 
was contrary to the evidence adduced at trial. The Su-
preme Court in refusing to overturn the verdict stated 
as follows: 
It would only be when such refusal did such vio-
lence to common sense as to convince the court 
that that no trier of fact, acting fairly and rea-
sonably, would refuse to make such finding, that 
it would be reversed. 4 Utah 2d at 144. 
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Another criterion to be used is set out in Weenig 
Brothers v. Manning, 1 Utah 2d 101, 262 P.2d 491 (1953). 
This case arises out of an automobile accident, and the 
appellant alleged that the evidence was insufficient to 
support the verdict. In upholding the decision of the 
trial court the Supreme Court stated: 
In order to upset the judgment and command one 
in its favor, the first obstacle plaintiff must over-
come is to demonstrate that the evidence shows 
with such certainty that reasonable minds could 
not differ thereon, but the defendant was guilty 
of negligence which proximately caused the col-
lision. In absence of such degree of proof we 
could not direct that such finding be made and 
reverse the decision of the lower court. The de-
fendant, having prevailed on conflicting matters, 
the evidences are viewed in the light most favor-
able to him. 1 Utah 2d at 102. 
In an older case, Glen v. Rich, 106 Utah 232, 142 P.2d 
849 (1944) the appellant therein urged that the findings 
of the trial court were contrary to the preponderance 
of the evidence. The Utah Supreme Court in affirming 
the lower court 's decision stated: 
No good purpose can be served by detailing the 
evidence here. Suffice it to say that we have re-
viewed the record, and there is ample evidence 
from which the trial court could have made these 
findings. They are not against the prepon-
derance of the evidence and will not be dis-
turbed on appeal. 106 Utah at 240. 
In summary, it cannot be said that when all of the 
evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the re-
spondents, preponderates in favor of the defendants 
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Johnson and the defendants Clark. It further cannot be 
stated that when the evidence is viewed in a light most 
favorable to the respondents that the minds of reasonable 
men would find that the evidence preponderates in favor 
of the defendants Johnson and Clark who are now asking 
this court to overturn a jury verdict. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INFORM-
ING THE JURY THAT IF MR. JOHNSON 
SUSTAINED ANY LOSS, THAT THE BOND-
ING COMPANY WOULD PAY FOR SUCH 
LOSS AND IF IT WAS ERROR, IT WAS 
HARMLESS ERROR ON THE PART OF 
THE TRIAL COURT. 
f
 The appellants now claim error on the part of the 
trial court by virtue of the court's informing the jury of 
the terms of the bond which is plaintiffs' Exhibit B. The 
appellants fail to recall that one of the issues to be de-
termined by the trial court was the sufficiency of the 
bond. Counsel for the respondent Bennett's claimed that 
Bennett's was entitled to a verdict against the appellants 
first on the ground that the bond was insufficient, and 
secondly that the bond was never exhibited upon request. 
The comments made by the trial court were no more 
than the court explaining its ruling that the bond was 
sufficient in all respects. The court was merely explain-
ing to the jury why they would only be deciding the issue 
as to whether or not the bond was exhibited since the 
court ruled, as a matter of law, that the bond met the 
requirements of 14-2-1 and 14-2-2, U.C.A., 1953, as 
amended. 
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In addition, the bond itself had been admitted into 
evidence as plaintiffs' Exhibit B. The bond did provide 
that the principal, United States Fidelity and Guaranty, 
would hold Johnson harmless. The bond stated: 
Now, therefore, the condition of this obligation 
is such, that if the said principal shall well and 
truly perform and fulfill all and every the cove-
nants, conditions, stipulations and agreements in 
said contract mentioned to be performed and ful-
filled and shall keep the said obligee harmless and 
indemnified from and against all and every claim, 
demand, judgment, lien, cost and fee of every de-
scription incurred in suits or otherwise against the 
said obligee, growing out of or incurred in the 
prosecution of said work according to the terms of 
said contract, and shall repay to said obligee all 
sums of money which the said obligee may pay 
to other persons on account of work and labor 
done or materials furnished on or for said con-
tract, and if the said principal shall pay to the 
said obligee all damages or forefeitures which may 
be sustained by reason of the non-performance or 
malperformance on the part of said principal of 
any of the covenants, stipulations and agreements 
of said contract, then this obligation shall be void; 
otherwise the same shall remain in full force and 
virtue. 
It can be seen that the court was merely explaining to 
the jury the terms of plaintiffs' Exhibit which was ad-
mitted into evidence, without objection by the appellants. 
The appellants now claim that this led the jury to be-
lieve that Johnson would be entitled to be reimbursed 
if a judgment was rendered against him. The appellants 
overlook the second page of the bond wherein it is stated: 
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The surety shall not be liable under this bond to 
the obligees, or either of them, unless said obligees, 
or either of them, shall make payments to the 
principal strictly in accordance with the terms of 
said contract as to payment and shall perform 
all the other obligations to be performed under 
said contract at the time and in the manner therein 
set forth. 
Under the terms of the bond Johnson would be en-
titled to be indemnified by United States Fidelity and 
Guaranty for this judgment and, of course, the United 
States Fidelity and Guaranty would have a cause of action 
over against Downard under the terms of the bond. The 
reason Johnson did not have a cause of action over 
against the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Com-
pany was that he failed to make payments by his own ad-
mission as required under the contract which was at-
tached to and incorporated in the bond. 
It must be presumed that the jury was aware of this. 
If they were not aware of it, it was the attorney for the 
appellants' duty to make them aware of it by asserting 
this argument when summation was made to the jury. 
I t is asserted now by this respondent, for the reasons set 
forth above that it was not error for the court to explain 
its ruling, and if it was error, it was merely harmless 
error since the terms of the bond were already before 
the jury. 
A case involving a similar, not exactly the same fact 
situation, is Hardman v. Thurnicm, 121 Utah 143, 239 P.2d 
215 (1951). In that case the appellant objected to the testi-
mony of a witness, since the testimony was obviously 
heresay. The court at the trial level allowed the testi-
mony to come in. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that this 
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was not error stating that other competent evidence had 
been admitted and that, therefore, the appellant could 
show no prejudice. The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Complaint is made of the admission in evidence of 
the testimony of the secretary of the corporation 
for whom the decedent worked relative to discus-
sions between the witness and the board of direc-
tors dealing with Hardman's efficiency and his 
opportunities for advancement with the company. 
Conceding that his testimony in this respect is 
heresay, we think no prejudice resulted therefrom 
since the secretary of the company under whose 
immediate supervision Hardman worked testified 
to his own knowledge of decedent's qualifications 
and the likelihood of his advancement with the 
company. 121 Utah at 150. 
The appellant now takes the position that quite 
possibly the jury felt that a verdict against Johnson was 
a verdict against the "deep pockets" of United States 
Fidelity and Guaranty. To do this we must assume that 
the jury disregarded its instructions, disregarded the 
exhibits, and the oath it took at trial. On the other hand, 
it could very well be that the jury listened to its instruc-
tions, honored the oath it took and reviewed the evidence 
recalling argument of counsel and, of course, the respond-
ents are entitled to the presumption that this is, in fact, 
what occurred. It could be that the jury realized that the 
Johnsons and he darks received a building reasonably 
worth the sum of $31,860.00 yet only paid the sum of 
$29,189.81 for it. 
CONCLUSION 
In reviewing all of the points asserted by both the 
appellants and the respondents it is obvious that this case 
was properly submitted to the court as a question of 
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fact. The trial court did rule on one issue as a matter 
of law and this is the issue concerning the sufficiency of 
the bond. The trial judge felt that at the conclusion of 
the case this was a case to be decided by the jury and 
stated this once again when the appellants' motion for a 
new trial was denied. 
The trial court properly instructed the jury as to the 
law concerning implied contracts and when the jury, 
having been instructed properly as to the law and con-
sidering all the evidence, returned the verdict in favor 
of the respondent. To overturn this verdict would be to 
deny the respondents a right to a trial by jury. It would 
be a holding that all of the evidence adduced on behalf 
of the respondents would be disbelieved with all of the 
evidence adduced on behalf of the appellant be given 
greater weight. 
The appellant further claims that the jury would be 
misled by the statement of the trial judge. The attorney 
for the appellants failed to realize that the jury had had 
all of the exhibits before it from which to make a decision. 
Respondents being entitled to a presumption that the 
jury acted correctly in all respects submits that this ver-
dict should not be overturned and the verdict of the trial 
court affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHILIP R. FISHLER of 
STRONG & HANNI 
604 Boston Building 
l>•:•:v Sail;Lake City, Utah I , 
Attorneys for Defendant 
amd Respondent Downard 
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